The U.S. economy has undergone major structural changes over the postwar period. First, employment has shifted from goods-producing industries to services. Second, since the 1970s at least, there has occurred a rapid increase in the introduction of new information-based technologies. Third, this has been accompanied by substantial adjustments in operations and organizational re-structuring of firms. Fourth, concomitant with these changes has occurred increasing competition from imports and greater orientation toward exports.
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS LITERATURE
In contrast to the literature on rising earnings inequality, there has been relatively little work done to explain the growth of average wages in the United States, particularly its slowdown after 1973. Levy and Murnane (1996a) point to skills as an important determinant of changes in earnings. They reported as one of their major findings that employers are now screening employees more on actual skills possessed rather than simply years of schooling or college degree. Using two large sets of panel data, the first of high school graduates in 1972 and the second of high school graduates in 1980, they examined whether the relation between math and reading scores on standardized tests and the earnings of the high school graduates six years after graduating. They found that the correlation between earnings and test scores was higher for the later panel than the earlier one and that high math test scores were, in particular, more highly correlated with wages for the later graduates. They identified several "basic skills" that were now more highly valued by employers: (i) the ability to read and perform mathematics at a ninth-grade level; (ii) effective oral and writing communications skills; (iii) ability to work effectively with workers from different social, racial, and ethnic backgrounds; and (iv) computer skills. The policy message emanating from this work is that the content of education --that is, what the student actually learns --not years of schooling, is crucial to success in the labor market.
Some have maintained that technology is the main culprit. Johnson and Stafford (1993) argued that the erosion of large returns from American technological leadership has been the principal factor in explaining the stagnation of American wages since 1973. Acs and Danziger (1993) , using CPS data over the period 1979 to 1989, reported that average earnings had declined among male workers. They attributed the decline mainly to increases in the returns to education and experience, which they interpreted as deriving mainly from technological change. They did not find any significant effect from shifts in industrial employment patterns on the basis of 13 broad industry grouping.
Another view is that the expansion of international trade after 1973 was a principal factor in explaining wage stagnation. The prevailing argument derives from the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade. As Leamer (1992) argued, increased capital formation among American trading partners abroad has led toward factor price equalization --in particular, wage equalization across countries. Wage convergence can come about either through a rise in wages among America's trading partners or through a decline in U.S. wages. It is likely that the latter trend has dominated over the last three decades. Wood (1994) makes a similar argument. Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) concluded that international trade played almost no role in explaining the slow growth of worker compensation since the 1970s, especially in relation to labor productivity growth. Instead, using aggregate time-series data for the U.S. business sector, they found that the stagnation of real wages in the U.S. (and its convergence with that of trading partners) was due mainly to slow productivity growth in the nontraded goods sectors of the American economy between 1979 and 1991. Indeed, worker compensation deflated by production prices (instead of the CPI) grew just as rapidly as worker productivity over this period.
Others looked to institutional factors, such as unionization and the minimum wage. Freeman (1993) argued that the decline of unions in the American economy and/or the decline in the real value of the minimum wage since the late 1960s removed the "safety net" supporting the wage level of unskilled workers, thereby allowing it to fall. Ferguson (1996) , using three-digit industry level data on unionization and aggregate time series data on wages over the period [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] , estimated that 18 percent of the increase in the gap between real wage growth and aggregate labor productivity growth could be ascribed to the decline in unionization and perhaps another 25 percent to the declining ability of unions to raise wages. Gordon (1996) argued that the change in these two factors was part of a broader range of institutional changes in the 1980s in which American corporate mangers exerted increasing pressure on workers, partly in reaction to rising international competition. Gordon further documented the declining real wage of American workers and argued that the growing power of management and the concomitant decline in worker power were largely responsible for this trend. Reich (1998) took issue with Gordon and reported that most of the increase in managerial labor occurred in the early part of the postwar period, when labor power was increasing.
Industry Level Wages
A couple of recent studies have looked at the relation between industry technological change and industry wages. Using CPS data for 1979 and 1989 segmented into 39 industries, Allen (1996) found that returns to schooling are higher in industries that are intensive in R&D and high-tech capital and that wage differentials between industries are positively related to R&D intensity, intensity of usage of high-tech capital, capital vintage, the growth in total factor productivity, and the growth of the capital-labor ratio. However, Bartel and Sicherman (1997) , matching industry level measures of technological activity to the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth over the 1979-1993 period and controlling for individual fixed effects, found no evidence that the industry wage premium was correlated with the industry rate of technology change.
Several have looked at the effects of trade on industry level wages. Freeman and Katz (1991) found from regressing industry level wages on industry imports and exports that the former had a depressing effect on wages while the latter had a positive effect. Davis (1992) , using industry level wage data from nine advanced countries and four middle-income countries, found that the growth of the import share induced a large and statistically significant convergence toward the average structure of relative industry wages, while the growth in export share caused a smaller but statistically significant divergence. Gaston and Treffler (1994) , using 1984 CPS data with worker characteristics matched with trade data, reported that exports had a positive wage effect and imports a smaller negative wage effect, even after controlling for worker characteristics. Levy and Murnane (1992) concluded in their survey of sources of earnings inequality that firm-and plant-specific effects are important sources of earnings differences among workers. Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) , using data on U.S. manufacturing plants from 1963 to 1986, provided some evidence of this, particularly that one half of the total wage variation among manufacturing workers was accounted for by differences in average wages among plants. Moreover, these plant specific effects on wages were associated with such factors as plant size and age, industry, and capital intensity. Groshen (1991) provided similar evidence --namely, that occupation and establishment along explained over 90 percent of the variation of wages among blue-collar workers. Dunne and Schmitz (1992) , also using manufacturing plant data, estimated that workers at establishments classified as the most technology intensive earned 16 percent more than those at the least technology intensive plants. Dunne, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Troske (2000) , using more recent establishment data, concluded that a substantial portion of the rising dispersion in wages is due to increases in wage differentials between establishments. The latter, in turn, are attributable to plant-level productivity differences and are correlated with both computer intensity and overall capital intensity.
Other factors considered in the literature include profitability. Blanchflower, Oswald, and Sanfey (1996) , using panel data for the manufacturing sector derived from the CPS over the period 1964 to 1985 and controlling for workers' characteristics, unionization, and industry fixed effects, concluded that a rise in an industry's profitability leads after a lag to increased average wages within the industry. They estimated that rent-sharing alone may account for as much as one quarter of earnings inequality among full-time workers. Figure 1 and Table 1 document trends in both overall average wages and salaries and overall average employee compensation, defined as wages and salaries plus the fringe benefits provided by employers, over the period from 1947 to 1997. I have used as wide an assortment of measures of labor compensation as possible from available data sources. Fortunately, the results are surprisingly consistent among these alternative series. These include the Bureau of Labor Statistics series on hourly wages and salaries of production and non-supervisory workers in the total private sector and the Employment Cost Index (ECI) for all workers in private industry; National Income and Product Account (NIPA) data on employee compensation for all workers, including those employed in the government; and Current Population Survey data on median and mean earnings for year-round, full-time workers. In the case of the NIPA data, I also include a portion of proprietors' income in my measure of total labor earnings and divide this total by the sum of employed and self-employed workers. The reason for including only a portion of proprietors' income is that part of the income of self-employed workers is a return on the capital invested in unincorporated businesses. The results show that the resulting time-series is quite insensitive to the fraction used in the calculation.
OVERALL EARNINGS TRENDS
The data show a very rapid growth in wages and salaries over the period , where it peaks in almost every series, followed by a moderate decline between 1973 and 1997. For the period before 1973, annual growth rates for wages and salaries are in the range of 1.8 to 2.7 percent. For the period 1973-1997, four of the seven series show a decline in real earnings, ranging from -0.1 to -0.8 percent per year, while the other three show either no change or a very modest increase (at most, 0.3 percent per year). All the wage series except one show some pick up in wage growth (or, at least, a smaller decline) in the period after 1989, compared to the 1973-89 period.
The results are somewhat different for total employee compensation, the sum of wages and salaries and fringe benefits. As with real wages and salaries, all series show robust growth in the period before 1973, ranging from 2.6 to 2.7 percent per year. For the 1973-1997 period, the data show a slight increase, of about 0.1 to 0.2 percent per year. Here, too, the growth in compensation seems to accelerate somewhat after 1989. A comparison of lines 3 and 12 indicates the reason for the difference in time trends between wages and salaries on the one hand and total employee compensation on the other hand. While the former have remained relatively flat after 1973, employee benefits have risen very rapidly, at 1.2 percent per year.
Wages and Skills on the Aggregate Level
One of the most perplexing issues of recent years is that despite the continued growth in educational attainment and even workplace skills, real earnings have stagnated since the early 1970s. My skill measures are derived from the fourth (1977) edition of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) for my skill measures. For some 12,000 job titles, it provides a variety of alternative measures of job-skill requirements based upon data collected between 1966 and 1974. This probably provides the best source of detailed measures of skill requirements covering the period 1950 to 1990. Three measures of workplace skills are developed from this source for each of 267 occupations, as follows (see Wolff, 1996 , for more details):
1. Substantive Complexity (SC) is a composite measure of skills derived from a factor analytic test of DOT variables. It was found to be correlated with General Educational Development, Specific Vocational Preparation (training time requirements), Data (synthesizing, coordinating, analyzing), and three worker aptitudes -Intelligence (general learning and reasoning ability), Verbal and Numerical.
2. Interactive Skills (IS) can be measured, at least roughly, by the DOT "People" variable, which, on a scale of 0-8, identifies whether the job requires mentoring (0), negotiating (1), instructing (2), supervising (3), diverting (4), persuading (5), speaking-signaling (6), serving (7) or taking instructions (8). For comparability with the other measures, this variable is rescaled so that its value ranges from 0 to 10 and reversed so that mentoring is now scored 10 and taking instructions is scored 0.
3. Motor Skills (MS) is another DOT factor-based variable. Also scaled from 0 to 10, this measure reflects occupational scores on motor coordination, manual dexterity and "things" -job requirements that range from setting up machines and precision working to feeding machines and handling materials.
Average industry skill scores are computed as a weighted average of the skill scores of each occupation, with the occupational employment mix of the industry as weights. Computations are performed for 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 on the basis of consistent occupation by industry employment matrices for each of these years constructed from decennial Census data. There are 267 occupations and 64 industries.
4. Composite Skills. I also introduce a measure of composite skill, CS, which is based on a regression of hourly wages in 1970 on SC, MS, and IS scores across the 267 occupations (see the next section). The resulting formula is: CS = 0.454 SC + 0.093 MS + 0.028 IS A fifth measure derived from Census data is also used:
5. Mean Years of Schooling. These are derived directly from decennial Census of Population data for years 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 . Table 2 confirm these observations. Over the 1947-1973 period, BLS mean hourly earnings are almost perfectly correlated with trends in both Substantive Complexity (SC) and the Composite Skill Index (CS); median years of schooling, the percent of high school graduates, and the percent of college graduates among persons age 25 and over; and the mean years of schooling of the labor force. However, over the 1973-1996 period, the reverse is true: mean wages are almost directly inversely correlated with both skill levels and educational levels, with correlation coefficients ranging from -0.84 to -0.94.
Like BLS hourly earnings, NIPA mean wages and salaries and NIPA mean employee compensation are also almost perfectly correlated with skill levels and schooling levels over the period form 1947 to 1973. Over the 1973-1997 period, NIPA mean earnings have virtually zero correlation with both skill and schooling levels. Results for the post-1973 period are better for NIPA mean employee compensation. In this case, the correlation coefficients are positive, ranging from 0.57 to 0.61, though still smaller than the correlation coefficients for the pre-1973 period. In sum, for all three earnings measures, a significant break is evident in the association of wages to both skills and schooling in the early 1970s.
A few words should be said about another apparent anomaly, which is that the historical connection between labor productivity growth and real wage growth also appears to have broken down after 1973. In the case of an economy characterized by an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function, wages and labor productivity should be perfectly correlated. In this case,
where y is total output, n is total employment, k is the total capital stock, and is the wage share. Labor productivity is given by:
The real wage w is given by:
(1) w = (y/n) Moreover, it directly follows by taking the time derivative of equation (1) that the growth in wages (w*) should be equal to that of labor productivity (y* -n*):
(2) w* = y*-n* From 1947 (if not earlier) to 1973, real wages grew almost in tandem with the overall labor productivity growth. As shown in Table 2 , the correlation coefficients between the two measures of labor productivity and the three indices of real wages range from 0.99 to 1.00 for this period.
Labor productivity growth plummeted after 1973. Between 1947 and 1973, it averaged 2.0 or 2.4 percent per year, depending on the measure, while from 1973 to 1997 it averaged about 0.8 percent per year (see Panel C of Table 1 ). The period from 1973 to 1979, in particular, witnessed the slowest growth in labor productivity during the postwar, 0.5 percent per year, and the growth in real wages actually turned negative during this period by all measures. Since 1979, the U.S. economy experienced a modest reversal in labor productivity growth, which averaged 0.9 percent per year by both measures from 1979 to 1997, while real wage growth ranged from -0.2 to 0.6 percent per year, depending on the index. Consequently, for the 1973-1997 period, the correlation coefficients between labor productivity and real earnings are substantially lower than in the early postwar period --(highly) negative in the case of hourly earnings, slightly positive in the case of NIPA mean wages and salaries, and a value of 0.76 in the case of average employee compensation. In section 4 below, we will return to the issue of how well wages have tracked labor productivity movements.
Wages, Skills, and Educational Attainment on the Occupational Level
The evidence thus far suggest a growing bifurcation between wages and skills at least since the early 1970s. This leads to the intriguing issue of whether the returns to skill (and education) have declined over this period as well.
I first consider the relation between wages and skills on the occupational level. The results for the different components of workplace skill are shown in The two tables show a rather different pattern in the returns to workplace skill in comparison to educational attainment. In particular, the evidence suggests, rather surprisingly, that the return to cognitive abilities, after rising steeply between 1950 and 1970, has since fallen off rather substantially. In contrast, the returns to schooling, particularly at the college and advanced levels, climbed almost continuously between 1950 to 1990. This is consistent with the general evidence that the returns to a college degree relative to a high school diploma increased over the last three decades (see, for example, Katz and Murphy, 1992) . Moreover, while the explanatory power of the human capital earnings regressions increased almost monotonically over time, from 1950 to 1990, the goodness of fit of the skills regression peaked in 1970. I shall return to this issue in the conclusion of this chapter.
Another interesting result is that while the returns to cognitive skills fell after 1970, the returns to Motor Skills have also declined, in this case since 1960. In contrast, Interactive Skills have been growing in importance since 1950 and by 1990 had overtaken Motor Skills in explaining occupational earnings. These results suggest that the workplace is rewarding people skills more over time and cognitive skills less, at least since 1970. This finding appears to conflict with the findings of Levy and Murnane (1996b) that cognitive abilities have become more important in the workplace over time.
INDUSTRY EFFECTS AND OVERALL WAGE GROWTH
Changes in average earnings are due to both changes in wages on the industry level and shifts of employment between low-wage and high-wage industries. In this section, I examine whether the stagnation of real wages that has occurred over the last two and a half decades is primarily attributable to across-the-board wage declines on the industry level or to the shift of workers from high-wage industries (such as durables manufacturing) to low-wage ones (such as retailing). Table 5 shows average earnings by major sector in 1970 relative to the overall mean. By all three measures, agriculture had by far the lowest earnings (about half of the overall level), followed by retail trade (about three fourths of the overall level), and other services (about 80 percent of the overall figure) . The best paying sector by all three measures is utilities (30 to 43 percent above average), followed by mining, construction, durable manufacturing, transportation, and communications (the rank order of the five sectors varies a bit depending on the measure). Goods producing industries pay about 10 percent above average, while services pay about 7 or 8 percent below average.
The spread is even more extreme on the basis of data for individual industries. The ratio of average employee compensation to the overall average in 1970 ranged from lows of 0.25 in private households, 0.44 on farms, 0.62 in hotels, 0.66 in personal services, and 0.68 in retail trade to highs of 1.57 in transportation equipment (including automobiles), 1.63 among security and commodity brokers, 1.67 in air transportation, and 1.81 in petroleum and coal products. Changes in the overall earnings level are a result of both changes in the wage levels of individual industries and employment shifts among industries. The former is usually interpreted to reflect changes in technology within the industry, as well as other industry specific factors such as the presence of unions and exposure to import competition. The latter depends mainly on changes in demand patterns among consumers.
The formal decomposition is as follows. Let P = (row) vector showing the distribution of employment among industries. E = (column) vector showing average earnings by industry. e = PE = overall average earnings of employees.
Since our data are for discrete time periods, then (3) e = P E + ( P)E where E = E 2 -E 1 , P = P 2 -P 1 , and superscripts refer to time period. The results are based on average period weights, which provides an exact decomposition. The first term on the right-hand side of equation (1) measures the effect of changes in the wage levels within industry, while the second term measures the effect of shifts in industry employment. Table 6 shows the results of this decomposition. For both the 1950s and the 1960s, over 90 percent of the change in average earnings was due to changes in mean earnings within industry according to all three earnings measures. The employment shift effect, on the other hand, was minimal.
This is not to say that employment was not shifting among industries during these years. Three major changes occurred. First, employment shifted out of low wage agriculture (a 1.4 percentage point decline in farm employment in the 1950s and a 1.6 percentage point decline in the 1960s). Second, there was an offsetting decline in employment share in high-paying manufacturing (a 2.35 percentage point drop for the entire sector in both the 1950s and the 1960s). Third, there were substantial gains of employment in the government sector, particularly state and local government, which paid close to average wages (a 2.8 percentage point increase in the 1950s for the entire government sector and a 1.9 percentage point increase in the 1960s). However, the employment shifts were, on net, offsetting (actually slightly positive with regard to the change in average earnings).
The period after 1970 saw four major changes. First, wage gains on the industry level fell off sharply after 1970 compared to the two preceding decades (indeed, in the case of average wages and salaries, the change was negative in the 1970s). Second, by 1970 employment in agriculture had fallen to 2.0 percent of total employment, so that further declines in the agricultural share had a minimal effect on average earnings. Third, the decline in the share of total employment in high wage manufacturing continued unabated after 1970--indeed, accelerated (the share dropped by 3.6 percentage points in the 1970s, 4.5 points in the 1980s, and 1.4 points in the 1990-97 period). Fourth, government employment as a proportion of total employment actually peaked in 1970 and fell off thereafter.
As a result, the employment released from manufacturing was absorbed primarily in relatively low paying service industries, and the employment shift effect turned negative in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. This coupled with the smallest growth of earnings on the industry level of any the five decades (negative in the case of mean wages and salaries) led to the lowest annual increase of earnings during the 1970s of the five decades.
During the 1980s, earnings on the industry level grew considerably faster than in the 1970s, while the employment shift effect became even more negative. However, on net, average earnings increased faster during this decade than in the 1970s. During the period from 1990 to 1997, earnings growth on the industry level again slowed, while the employment shift remained negative, so that overall earnings growth again diminished.
Over the whole 1950-97 period, the predominant effect on overall earnings growth came from the growth of earnings on the industry level. This was due to the very large increases of industry earnings during the 1950s and 1960s. On net, the industry shift effect was negative but relatively small --resulting in an 8 percent decline in average wages and salaries, a 9 percent decline in average employee compensation, and only a 3 percent decline in average employee compensation plus half of proprietors' income. These results accord with those of Bound and Johnson (1992) and Katz and Murphy (1992) , who also found that the change of earnings on the industry level was the main determinant of overall earnings growth over similar periods. However, for the period 1970-1997, because there were no further gains in average wages from the release of labor from agriculture, employment shifts offset increases in industry earnings by between 27 and 47 percent, depending on the measure used.
DETERMINANTS OF WAGE CHANGES
I next investigate the factors that affect wage growth on both the aggregate and the industry level. I first consider the relation between changes of wages and the change in both average skill levels and human capital. Other factors include (1) technological change such as productivity growth and computerization, (2) international trade, (3) structural dimensions such as the split of employment between goods and service industries, (4) and institutional characteristics such as union density.
How does technological change affect wages? The role of the characteristic stages of the innovation process is somewhat complicated. Economic historians emphasize that, typically, when new technology or products reach the market they are relatively difficult to use, unreliable and in need of frequent attention, and limited in their range of application. Introduction is followed by a relatively long period of improvement that increases reliability, expands uses and makes them user friendly. This is the period in which standard measures of technical change (such as total factor productivity or TFP) show steady growth. Clear examples range from Watt's improved steam engine to the electronic computer.
The introduction of new technology thus appears to have two phases. In the first, the development and implementation of new inventions calls forth the need for highly skilled and educated workers and therefore higher paid employees. As a result, the initial period should be characterized by rising wages. The second stage, user friendliness, appears to reverse the process, making it easier for the unskilled to work with the new items. The simplification of technology and its routinization reduces the need for highly skilled and educated workers and makes its use by unskilled and low paid workers easier, increasing their demand. This phase should therefore see a reduction in average wages. 3
If we accept this argument, then R&D activity, which is an indicator of the development of new technology, should be positively correlated with the growth in earnings. In this regard, the evidence is mixed. Industry R&D expenditures as a share of GDP rose between the 1950s and the 1960s, fell off in the 1970s, increased once again in the 1980s, and then stabilized in the 1990s (see Figure 3. ) As a result, it is positively correlated with wage changes over time. However, scientists and engineers engaged in R&D per employee rose almost continuously between the late 1950s and the 1990s, and this variable is negatively correlated with earnings changes.
With regard to investment, the prevailing view is the capital-skills complementarity hypothesis. The argument is that greater investment may lead to a greater demand for skilled and therefore high paid labor since new capital normally embodies the latest and, presumably, more complex technology, which requires greater skills to put into operation (see, for example, Griliches, 1969) . Measures of investment are used to allow for the possibility that new technology may normally be embodied in new capital, particularly new equipment and machinery. The growth in the ratio of capital stock to employment may also reflect the rate at which new vintages of capital are introduced into the industry.
A few words should be said about computerization investment. Computers are like a two-edge sword. Their introduction can radically alter the workplace, requiring high-skilled computer experts and technicians and engineers to implement the new technology and therefore be positively associated with earnings. However, once in place, computers tend to simplify tasks and thus increase the demand for low-skilled and lower paid workers.
Here, again, the results are mixed. Total equipment investment as a share of GDP trended gradually upward over time, from the late 1940s to the 1990s (see Figure 4) , and this variable is slightly negatively correlated with earnings changes. In contrast, net stocks of office, computing, and accounting machinery (OCA) per worker, after rising slowly from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, accelerated in the ensuing 25 years (see Figure  4 .) As a result, this variable is highly negatively correlated with earnings growth.
International competitiveness, as measured by the ratio of exports to GDP and the ratio of imports to GDP, may also affect earnings growth. There are two possibilities. One is that industries competing in international product markets or directly against imports might be forced to upgrade skills faster than domestic industries in order to remain competitive (the "high road" hypothesis). A second possibility is that such industries might be forced to compete on the basis of cost and thus have an incentive to replace high paid workers with low paid ones and downgrade skill levels (the "low road" hypothesis). As shown in Figure 5 , both export and import intensity, after rising very slowly from 1947 to 1973, more than doubled between 1973 and 1997, at the same time that earnings stagnated. As a result, the two series have a strong negative correlation.
Structural and organizational dimensions of production may also affect wage growth. Unionization may be associated with earnings growth since unionized trades, firms and industries typically pay more than non-unionized ones. The unionization rate, after peaking in 1953, has fallen steadily over time (see Figure 5 ), and has a strong positive correlation with wage gains. The minimum wage should have a positive effect on earnings growth, since it raises wages at the bottom and may, through an "accordion effect" increase wages through the bottom of the occupational ladder. As shown in Figure 5 , the minimum wage in constant dollars reached its peak value in 1968 and generally fell over time until the early 1990s before rising slightly again. As as a result, the minimum wage valued in constant dollars has small negative correlation with earnings growth.
Another factor that may affect average earnings is the shift of employment to services, since services generally pay less than goods producers. This process has been going on almost steadily over time since the 1940s. As a result, this variable has a relatively strong negative correlation with the growth in earnings.
Aggregate Time-Series Regression Analysis
I next turn to regression analysis, which is conducted in two ways. The first uses annual time series data for wage changes and the other variables of interest. The second employs pooled cross-section time-series data, covering 44 industries (see Appendix Table 1 ) and four time ten-year periods. The dependent variables in both sets of regressions are annual changes in earnings.
Some preliminary words should be said about interpreting the regression results. As shown in the previous section, part of the growth in earnings is due to earnings changes at the industry level and the remaining part to intersectoral shifts in employment. Some factors like import competition exercise their influence by causing some industries to grow and others to shrink. Its effect will therefore be seen in the aggregate time-series data regressions but not in the industry-level analysis. The effects of other factors such as labor productivity growth will be seen only on the aggregate level since labor market forces (barring impediments to labor mobility) will lead toward wage equality across sectors. 4 Still other variables, like the unionization rate, will affect earnings behavior directly on the industry level. This variable may not be significant in the aggregate time-series regression. The interpretation of the regression results will thus depend on the findings at the two levels of analysis.
Results from time-series regressions covering the period 1948-1997 are shown in Table 7 for four wage measures. 5 I have selected the regression form with the highest adjusted R 2 -statistic (or, correspondingly, the lowest standard error of the regression). 6
Among the technology variables, labor productivity growth has the strongest effect on earnings growth. The coefficient is positive and significant at the one percent level in every case. The coefficient values are not significantly different from the share of the earnings (for the particular measure) in GDP but are significantly different than unity. This latter result is inconsistent with an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function, since, from Equation 2, earnings should grow at the same rate as labor productivity. 7 On the other hand, neither R&D intensity nor the number of scientists and engineers as a fraction of employment is statistically significant.
Among the investment variables, the most statistically significant is investment in equipment as a share of GDP. Its coefficient is positive and significant at either the five or one percent level in every case. The other important investment variable is the growth in office, computing, and accounting machinery (OCA) per employee. The coefficient of this variable is uniformly negative, and is significant for three of the four earnings measures. 8
The coefficients of both export and import are statistically significant and have a strong negative effect on earnings growth. The best fit comes from the sum of total imports and exports as a proportion of GDP, whose coefficient is uniformly negative and significant at the one percent level.
The minimum wage in constant (1992) dollars has the predicted positive bearing on changes in earnings but is significant (at the five percent level) in only two of the four cases. Somewhat surprisingly, its effect is stronger on total worker compensation than on wages and salaries. However, neither the unionization rate nor its annual change over time, is statistically significant. The change in the share of service employment in total employment has a coefficient that is generally negative but it is not significant in any of the regression forms.
The human capital and skill variables are next introduced into the regressions. Following the standard human capital model (see Mincer, 1974) , we have that:
where W i is wages (or earnings) of worker i, S i is the level of educational attainment of worker i, A is his or her age, and u i is a stochastic error term. It then directly follows that the growth in mean earnings is positively related to the change in mean schooling and mean age and negatively related to the change in the square of mean age. It should also follow that the growth in mean earnings should be directly related to the change in worker skills.
However, none of the education or experience variables (including the annual change in median schooling, mean schooling, the fraction of the population with a high school degree, the fraction with a college degree, and mean years of experience) is statistically significant. Moreover, none of the skill variables (including the annual change in Substantive Complexity SC, Interactive Skills IS, Motor Skills MS, and Composite Skills CS) is significant. Indeed, the coefficients of both SC and average schooling are generally negative (see the last two columns of Table 7 ). Moreover, even when the labor productivity growth, equipment investment, and OCA investment variables are omitted from the regression equation, the skill and human capital variables remain insignificant (results not shown).
Because of the sharp break in all the wage series that occurs after 1973, I have also replicated the regressions for the period 1973-1997 only. These results, shown in Table 8 , are remarkably similar to those presented in Table 7 based on the whole 1948-97 period, particularly for the three NIPA earnings measures. The most interesting changes occur for the BLS mean hourly earnings measure. The coefficient of the growth in OCA per employee remains significant (at the five percent level) and has a negative sign. The coefficient of the minimum wage in constant dollars is also now significant (also at the five percent level) and has the predicted positive sign. In addition, the change in the unionization rate now shows up as a significant variable (at the five percent level), with the expected positive sign.
One implication of these two sets of regressions is that the factors that account for wage changes over the "peculiar" 1973-1997 period are by and large very much the same as those which explain wage changes over the whole postwar period. Another way to test this is to include a dummy variable for the 1973-1996 period in the time-series regressions covering the whole 1948-1996 period. When this is done, the coefficient on the dummy variable is found to be negative in every case but not significant (results not shown).
INDUSTRY LEVEL REGRESSIONS
I next turn to multivariate regressions on the industry level. I use 44 industries in the regression analysis. 9 The period of analysis is 1950-1990. 10 The sample consists of pooled cross-section time-series data, with observations on each of the 44 industries in 1950-60, 1960-70, 1970-80 and 1980-90 , for a total of 176 observations. The error terms are assumed to be independently distributed but may not be identically distributed and I use the White procedure for a heteroschedasticity-consistent covariance matrix in the estimation (see White, 1980) .
The dependent variable in the regressions is the average annual change in earnings over the ten-year period. Generally, I use the same set of independent variables for the industry level regressions as for the aggregate ones. Results are shown in Table 9 for three earnings measures. 11 I have again selected the regression forms with the highest adjusted R 2 -statistic (or, correspondingly, the lowest standard error of the regression). Dummy variables distinguishing the 1960-70, 1970-80, and 1980-90 periods from the 1950-60 period are also introduced but are not significant (results not shown).
As in the aggregate regressions, investment in both equipment and OCA remain very significant variables. The coefficients of these two variables are significant at the one percent level in all cases. The coefficient of the growth of total equipment per employee is again positive, while the coefficient of the growth in OCA per employee is again negative. In contrast to the aggregate time-series regressions, industry labor productivity growth (as well as TFP growth) is not found to be a significant determinant of wage changes on the industry level.
The change in exports as a share of total sales is also found to have a negative effect on wage changes in all cases. Its coefficient is significant at the one percent level in regressions without human capital variables and is significant at only the 10 percent level in regressions that include such variables. However, none of the other trade variables, including (the level of) either exports or imports as a percent of total sales, and the change in the share of imports in gross output, is significant.
A dummy variable discriminating between service and goods industries is also introduced and found to be significant in a few cases. The coefficient is negative, indicating that once controlling for other factors, earnings compensation growth tends to be lower in services than among goods producers. Human capital variables are also introduced. In only one of the three cases does the change in mean education within an industry have a positive effect on industry earnings, and even here its coefficient is significant at only the 10 percent level. The change in mean age is a more powerful variable, significant at the one percent level in two of the three cases and at the ten percent level in the other. However, it is unclear whether the higher wages associated with an older work force reflect the productivity enhancing effects of work experience or the higher wages paid on the basis of seniority. The fact that the age squared variable is generally insignificant suggests the latter interpretation.
As in the aggregate regressions, none of the R&D variables or the number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D per employee, is found to be statistically significant. Nor are any of the skill change variables significant, including Substantive Complexity, Interactive Skills, Motor Skills, and Composite Skills. Somewhat surprisingly, the unionization rate, as well as the change in the rate of unionization over the period, also turn out to be insignificant. Regressions run over different sub-periods do not materially differ from those reported in Table 9 for the whole 1950-90 period.
In sum, when we consider both the aggregate time-series and the pooled cross-section industry results, we find that average earnings has a strong correlation with labor productivity on the aggregate level but not on the industry level. A similar result was reported by Leslie (1985) on the basis of regression analysis on twenty two-digit manufacturing industries over the period . This makes sense since labor market forces will tend to equalize wages across industries unless there are barriers, such as imposed by unions, to cross-industry labor mobility. 12 Other technological factors such as R&D investment do not affect wages directly but may affect them indirectly by stimulating productivity growth.
Both investment in equipment as a share of GDP and the growth in the stock of equipment per worker exert strong positive effects on wage growth. This force operates on both the aggregate and industry level. These results are consistent with the capital-skills complementarity argument --namely, that the adoption of new capital equipment calls forth the need for high skilled (and thus high paid) workers.
In contrast, investment in OCA and information technology equipment in general, as well as the rate of growth of both OCA and IT equipment per worker, have a strong negative bearing on earnings growth. This effect too operates on both the aggregate and industry level. This result is consistent with the argument that IT investment eliminates average paying jobs and replaces them with low paid positions.
International trade has a decidedly negative impact on average earnings, on the aggregate level. This is true for both imports and exports. It is also found that on the industry level the change in export intensity has a negative effect on wage changes, though no significant effect is found for import intensity. These results support the argument that import competition has eliminated many high paying manufacturing jobs and caused employment in these industries to decline. Moreover, the results on the industry level with regard to export intensity lend credence to the low road hypothesis about export competition. In particular, industries that remain competitive in terms of exports accomplish this by eliminating high skill jobs and thus inhibiting wage growth.
On the aggregate level, the growth in education, experience, or worker skills is not found to have any significant effect on the growth in wages. One possibility is that increases in human capital or skill levels affect wages indirectly by promoting productivity growth. However, the skill and human capital variables remain insignificant even when the labor productivity growth variable is eliminated from the aggregate regression equation. On the industry level, skill growth remains uncorrelated with earnings growth but there is some weak evidence that increases in worker schooling levels may be positively associated with wage gains and some stronger evidence that worker age is positively related to wage increases.
The aggregate time-series results support the view that the falling minimum wage in the U.S. has induced employers to hire relatively greater numbers of low-paid workers. These results also provide some weak evidence that the decline in unionization, at least after 1973, has led to a reduction of earnings for non-supervisory workers. However, on the industry level there is no statistical evidence that the level or change in unionization within industry has affected average wages within that industry.
Earnings Growth by Educational Level
On the basis of CPS data, the only educational groups that have seen growth in earnings since 1975 are college graduates without advanced schooling (a 10 percent gain in earnings between 1975 and 1997) and college graduates with advanced degrees (a 27 percent gain). High school graduates have generally held steady in terms of earnings, while those with less than a high school degree have seen their real compensation decline (by 13 percent). This divergence in earnings explains the rising returns to education over the last two decades. Table 10 presents time-series regressions of the growth of earnings by educational level on the same set of factors as in Section A above to shed light on some of the reasons for this divergence. Due to data limitations, the regressions are performed only for the period from 1976 to 1997, so that they have to be interpreted with some caution. However, notwithstanding, four results are particularly striking.
First, OCA investment has a depressing effect on earnings for all educational groups but its effect is statistically significant only for schooling groups with less than a B.A. degree. Second, international trade has a similar negative impact on earnings among all educational classes and its coefficient is significant for all schooling levels except for those with 5 or more years of university education. Third, R&D intensity reduces earnings at all levels of educational attainment except among those with more than four years of college but its coefficient is significant only for those groups with less than a college degree. Fourth, somewhat surprisingly, the minimum wage, the change in the minimum wage, the unionization rate, and the change in the unionization rate are not significant in any of the regressions, though the shorter time period used here is the likely explanation.
CONCLUSION
One of the basic tenets of human capital theory is that rising schooling will cause, or at least be associated with rising wages. However, the paper began by raising the seeming paradox that while earnings and education did grow hand in hand from the end of World War II to the early 1970s, this relation appeared to end after this point. After 1973, in fact, while earnings stagnated (or declined, in the case of BLS average hourly and weekly earnings) educational attainment continued to grow.
Annual time-series regressions of earnings growth on the change in educational attainment fail to produce a significant (or even a positive) coefficient on the change in average schooling levels. Cross-industry regressions do establish a small but positive effect of changes in average educational attainment among workers within the industry on the change in average industry earnings but the coefficient is significant in only one case and even then just marginally significant (at the ten percent level).
Evidence establishing a positive and significant relation between earnings growth and changes in worker skill levels is even bleaker. As with educational attainment, cognitive and people skills continued to growth after 1973 at about the same pace as before 1973, while earnings either flattened or declined. As a result, both annual time-series regressions and cross-industry regressions fail to establish any significant relation between gains in earnings and changes in skill levels.
The strongest positive evidence is provided in the cross-occupation regressions of occupational earnings on average educational attainment within occupation, which show not only positive and significant coefficients on schooling level but rates of return rising over the 1950-1990 period. Moreover, regressions of occupational earnings on occupational skill do show positive and significant coefficients on cognitive skills, motor skills, and, in later years, people skills. However, while the coefficient and significance level of these coefficients peak in 1970 for cognitive and motor skills, they increase over time for people skills through 1990.
It was also argued that in an economy characterized by an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function, earnings should rise at exactly the same rate as overall labor productivity. This was generally the case in the period from 1947 to 1973, with correlations between earnings growth and labor productivity growth close to unity, but for the period after 1973 correlations between the two are much lower (and, in some cases, negative). In annual time-series regressions over the full 1947 to 1997 period, labor productivity growth is found to be a positive and highly significant (at the one percent level) determinant of earnings growth. However, its coefficient is (significantly) less than unity. Moreover, in cross-industry regressions, industry labor productivity growth fails to appear as a significant factor in explaining industry earnings growth, a result that implies that earnings in an industry are influenced by economy-wide productivity growth, not that of the particular industry.
Another factor that might affect wage growth is interindustry employment shifts. Over the entire postwar period, employment has generally shifted out of high-paying goods producing industries into low-paying services. During the 1950s and 1960s, this negative effect of employment shifts on average earnings was offset by the reduction of jobs in low-paying agriculture, so that the net effect was minimal. However, in the 1970-97 period, further reduction of employment in agriculture was limited, so that the net effect of employment shifts was substantially negative, offsetting increases in industry A third factor is investment activity. The prevailing view is the capital-skills complementarity hypothesis. This states that investment will lead to greater demand for skilled labor since new capital embodies the latest technology, which requires greater skills to put into operation. Results from both the annual time-series and the cross-industry regressions indicate that investment in equipment exerts strong positive effects on wage growth.
A fourth is computerization, which, I argued, may have two contradictory effects. The first is that the introduction of computers can radically alter the workplace, requiring high-skilled computer experts and engineers to implement the new technology. The second is that once in place, computers tend to simplify tasks and thus increase the demand for low-skilled and lower paid workers. The regression results on both the annual time-series data and the cross-industry data provide strong support for the second hypothesis, that computerization depresses average wages. This retardant effect on wages is particularly strong for less educated workers (those with less than four years of college).
A fifth is international trade, which also may have two opposing effects. One is the high road hypothesis that industries competing in international product markets or directly against imports might be forced to upgrade skills in order to remain competitive. The other is the low road hypothesis that such industries might be forced to compete on the basis of cost and thus have an incentive to replace high paid workers with low paid ones. The time-series regression results indicate that both exports and imports have a decidedly negative impact on average earnings, while results of the cross-industry regressions find a negative relation between export growth and earnings growth. These findings are consistent with those of Leamer (1992) and Wood (1994) but not with those of Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) . International trade also appears to reduce wages for all educational groups except those with more than four years of college.
The last possibility relates to organizational and structural dimensions. The aggregate time-series results provide some, though relatively weak, evidence to support the view that the falling minimum wage in the U.S. has been a contributor to stagnant wages. There is also some evidence, though even weaker, that the decline in unionization, at least after 1973, has led to a reduction of earnings for non-supervisory workers. These results are not as strong as those reported by Freeman (1993) , Ferguson (1996) , or Gordon (1996) .
What then is responsible for the stagnation of labor earnings after 1973? The major contributing factors appear to be rising international trade, which doubled as a share of GDP over the period from 1973 to 1997; the slowdown in labor productivity growth, which fell by about two thirds between the 1947-73 and the 1973-97 periods; and the acceleration in the growth of OCA per employee, which almost doubled between the two periods. These negative effects were partially offset by the growth in equipment investment, which increased by more than 50 percent as a share of GDP between the two periods.
A final word should be added on the skill-biased technical change hypothesis that has been advanced to explain the rising returns to education observed over the last two and a half decades (see, for example, Bound and Johnson, 1992; and Katz and Murphy, 1992) . The results reported here indicate that rising returns, particularly to a college degree, is not a simple skill-bias demand story. Indeed, while real earnings of college graduates haven risen moderately since the early 1970s, those of high school graduates have remained flat, and those of other educational groups have declined. This divergence in earnings accounts for the rising returns to education over the last two decades.
However, there is no evidence that high tech investment, such as computers, has caused the earnings of college graduates to rise. Rather, the econometric evidence suggests that computerization has had a negative effect on the earnings of all educational groups, though the depressive impact has been greater for those with less schooling than more. Thus, IT and other high tech investment have helped raise the returns to a college degree by lowering the earnings of high school graduates rather than by raising the earnings of college graduates.
These results are not inconsistent with those of Krueger, (1993) and Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) , who found an earnings premium of 15 percent or more to users of computers relative to workers who do not use computers. However, the apparent mechanism is not that computer usage leads to growth of real earnings grow but rather that non-users have seen their real earnings drop.
DATA APPENDIX

Employee Compensation and Employment Data
a. BLS mean hourly and weekly earnings. 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 are derived from the decennial U.S. Census of Population Public Use Samples for the corresponding years.
Output, Investment and Capital Stock Data
a. Investment data refer to non-residential fixed investment in constant (1992) dollars and GDP to GDP in constant (1992) dollars. Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Internet. b. For technical details, see Katz and Herman (1997) 5. Imports and exports. The data are interpolated for years 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 . Source (aggregate data): U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Internet. Sources (industry-level data): U.S. input-output data for years 1947, 1958, 1963, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 , and 1996 provided on computer tape or diskette by the Bureau of Economic analysis. Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985) ; Hirsch and Macpherson (1993) 1947-1997 1947-1973 1973-1997 1973-1989 1989-1997 A. Wages and Salaries Note: The sample consists of pooled cross-section time-series data, with observations on each of 44 industries (excluding the government sector) in 1950-60, 1960-70, 1970-70, and 1980-90 . The coefficients are estimated using the White procedure for a heteroschedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. The absolute value of the t-statistic is shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimate. See the Data Appendix for sources and methods. Labor productivity is measured by the ratio of GDP in 1992 dollars to Persons Engaged in Production (PEP) Mean schooling and age are computed for the employees in each sector. # Significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test) * Significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test) ** Significant at the 1% level (two-tailed test) 
BLS mean hourly earnings
NOTES
Several alternative regression forms were also used. First, median years of schooling and median age and age squared were substituted for the mean values of these variables. The resulting coefficients are almost identical to those estimated from the mean values, though the goodness of fit is slightly worse. Second, for 1970, I introduced a variable measuring median years of work experience by occupation in place of median age. Since the correlation of median age with median work experience is 0.94, the coefficient estimate of median work experience is almost identical to that of median age.
It might seem paradoxical that wages increased faster in both the goods producing sector (110 percent) and services (115 percent) than overall (80 percent). The reason is that the change in overall earnings depends on both changes in earnings in each sector and the shift of employment between sectors. In this case, employment shifted out of high wage goods producers to the low wage services, which had a negative effect on the change in the overall wage level. See below for details on the decomposition.
This argument is also consistent with product life cycle models. See Vernon (1966 Vernon ( , 1979 , for example.
For example, the fact that measured labor productivity growth in the government sector has been close to zero over the postwar period has not prevented government salaries from rising at about the same rate as private sector earnings.
Regressions were also run on two CPS earnings series: median and mean wages and salaries of workers. However, the data are available only for shorter time periods (1961-1997 and 1968-1997, respectively . Still, the results are broadly similar to those reported in Table 7 .
Because the dependent variables in these regressions are annual rates of growth, there is unlikely to be a problem with non-stationarity. Similar results are found using the t-statistic test. In each case, we can reject the hypothesis of a unit root at the five percent level.
A related result is that TFP growth, when labor productivity growth is omitted from the regression equation, also has a coefficient that is positive in every case and significant at the one percent level in three of the four cases and at the five percent level in the other. However, when both labor productivity growth and TFP growth are included in the same equation, labor productivity growth is the dominant effect.
The coefficients of the growth of information processing and related equipment per employee, as well as those of the growth in OCA plus communication equipment per employee, are all negative as well and usually significant though the coefficients of the growth of computers and peripheral equipment per employee are generally not significant. However, the strongest effect comes from the OCA variable.
Capital stock data are generally not available for the government sector and this sector is therefore excluded from the data analysis.
Though data on unionization rates and R&D spending on the industry level are generally not available before 1960, these variables turned out to be insignificant, so that results are reported here for the full time-series.
The BLS hourly earnings data and the CPS earnings data are not available on the industry level.
Industries with low labor productivity growth will adjust to this by raising relative prices. See Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff (1989, Chapter 6) for more discussion of the unbalanced growth effect.
